

LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION: SURFACE DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION COMMAND (SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN

BY

COLONEL RICHARD J. KRAMER
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2009

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-02-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Leveraging Transformation: Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) in Okinawa, Japan				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Richard J. Kramer				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Bernie Griffard Center for Strategic Leadership				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Effective deployment and sustainment of United States expeditionary armed forces requires Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to implement all efficiencies and take advantage of all opportunities available to increase organizational flexibility and streamline seaport planning, operations and management. Challenged by the strategic global realignment of the United States, changes in the commercial shipping industry, and demand for further cost efficiencies, SDDC has restructured many of their permanent worldwide seaport operations. However, in certain key areas these efforts fall short of adequately transforming, and providing full support to the Combatant Commander. Using Okinawa, Japan as a case study will show how SDDC can further leverage transformation options, their impacts on overall costs, and operations to improve contingency planning.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Stevedore & Terminal Related Services (S&TRS) Contract, Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract (GPC), Okinawa Seaports, Government Furnished Materials (GFM), Afloat Preposition Program (APS), Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS), Common User Land Transportation (CULT), Naha Military Port (NMP), Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPIC)					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			UNLIMITED	32	

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION: SURFACE DEPLOYMENT &
DISTRIBUTION COMMAND (SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN**

by

Colonel Richard J. Kramer
United States Army

Professor Bernie Griffard
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Richard J. Kramer

TITLE: Leveraging Transformation: Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) in Okinawa, Japan

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 23 February 2009 **WORD COUNT:** 5,497 **PAGES:** 32

KEY TERMS: Stevedore & Terminal Related Services (S&TRS) Contract, Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract (GPC), Okinawa Seaports, Government Furnished Materials (GFM), Afloat Preposition Program (APS), Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS), Common User Land Transportation (CULT), Naha Military Port (NMP), Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPICT)

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Effective deployment and sustainment of United States expeditionary armed forces requires Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to implement all efficiencies and take advantage of all opportunities available to increase organizational flexibility and streamline seaport planning, operations and management. Challenged by the strategic global realignment of the United States, changes in the commercial shipping industry, and demand for further cost efficiencies, SDDC has restructured many of their permanent worldwide seaport operations. However, in certain key areas these efforts fall short of adequately transforming, and providing full support to the Combatant Commander. Using Okinawa, Japan as a case study will show how SDDC can further leverage transformation options, their impacts on overall costs, and operations to improve contingency planning.

LEVERAGING TRANSFORMATION: SURFACE DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION COMMAND (SDDC) IN OKINAWA, JAPAN

Fifty years ago most cargo moved in surface vessels as “Break-Bulk” loaded on pallets and lifted on or off vessels in cargo nets by either ship’s gear or shore cranes. Containerization changed ocean shipping forever.¹ Now vessels carry thousands of individual containers, discharging and reloading in hours vice days and weeks at each seaport of call. Service frequency, efficiency and volume are keys to a profitable shipping carrier in today’s competitive market environment.

The DoD organization most affected by changes in commercial transportation is the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Army Component Command (ACC), of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). SDDC’s mission is to “provide global surface deployment and distribution services to meet the nation’s objectives.”² They are the focal point for surface shipping and must deliver services at the right place, at the right time, and with value-added to meet its stakeholder’s demands. Meeting these demands requires compliance with Defense Transportation System (DTS) standards for cargo in-transit visibility, continued collaboration with partners and their stakeholders, and using feedback to improve SDDC business approaches.

As vessels increased in draft and length, many private and military seaports could no longer accommodate these modern vessels or support containerized handling requirements such as maintaining overhead gantry cranes. SDDC changed with industry by reducing the scope and manning of military seaports worldwide, as they were able to leverage commercial seaport capability. They used contracting in three ways to further increase overall efficiency and costs. First, they awarded Stevedore &

Related Terminal Services (S&RTS) contracts at military and commercial seaports.³

These requirements-based contracts replaced hundreds of military and civilian personnel who used to plan, execute and operate military seaports. When requested by a SDDC Contract Officer Representative (COR), the stevedore contractor provides the manpower and specialized equipment, and is only paid for labor and equipment ordered, the cargo moved and specialized equipment or services ordered by the COR. Second, SDDC awarded the Universal Services Contract (USC),⁴ a worldwide contract to move DoD cargo door to door for both unit moves and sustainment cargo.

Commercial carriers bid periodically on shipping routes from seaport to seaport as well as inland line-haul costs and other associated accessorial services. The USC covers both costs of moving containers as well as break-bulk cargo (usually moved via flat-racks).⁵ The contract allows the military flexibility in planning shipments, both large and small, as well as achieving cost effectiveness in most cases. Third, SDDC outsourced a large portion of their daily seaport workload with implementation of a Global Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) Contract (GPC) in 1998.⁶

While supporting current war efforts for deployment, redeployment and sustainment operations, SDDC continues to transform as they reduce their number of command layers and consolidate operations in response to Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC).⁷ Another factor impacting SDDC transformation efforts is the Army's plan for Global Repositioning of Forces. This largest force shift since WWII changes SDDC's sustainment and workload dynamics worldwide. In the Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska are growing in military end strength while Korea is reducing forces. In Okinawa, 8,000 Marines are scheduled to move to Guam over the next decade. With

increased pressure on cost savings and efficiency, SDDC needs to continue reforms to realign manpower to meet future force requirements, while satisfying all current exercise, contingency and sustainment missions. To illustrate the complexity of the challenges facing SDDC, this paper will focus on Okinawa, Japan. Okinawa's seaports' workloads, limitations and challenges will be discussed within the context of fourteen issues. The issues are broken down in three categories: outsourcing of non-core competencies; cost avoidance; and improved war fighter support readiness.

An Overview of SDDC in Okinawa, Japan

SDDC uses four seaports to support military operations in Okinawa: Naha Military Port (NMP); Tengan Pier, White Beach (which has both a Navy and Army Pier), and Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPICT). A discussion of the advantages, disadvantages and workloads (see Table 1) follows:⁸

Seaport Location	Berths	Total Pier or Berth Length (In feet)	Water Depth (In feet)	Pier Width (In Feet)
Tengan Pier	North	806	36	100
Tengan Pier	South	811	35	100
White Beach	Army-East	612	28	80
White Beach	Army-West	612	28.5	80
White Beach	Navy-East	790 (955 with extension)	35	100
White Beach	Navy-West	812 (977 with extension)	31	100
NPICT	2	2,000	54	Berth
NMP	1	750	28	Berth
NMP	2	776	25	Berth
NMP	3	752	24	Berth
NMP	4 (Upper)	505	28	Berth
NMP	4 (Lower)	501	28	Berth
NMP	5	600	18	Berth

Table 1: Characteristics of Okinawa Seaports

The 835th US Transportation Battalion (SDDC) operates out of Naha Military Port, which is used for exercise cargo as well as retrograde or fielding cargo requirements. Table 2 depicts the workload at NMP over the last ten years.⁹ The downward trend in the numbers of vessels, and cargo volume is reflective of the changing ocean shipping environment, as well as the physical restrictions of NMP to berth modern vessels. First, more and more cargo is going via the USC Contract through NPICT as containerized or flat-rack cargo as it is more cost effective, efficient and on a Time Definite Delivery (TDD) schedule. Second, due to post 9/11 operational deployment requirements, annual exercise deployments to Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia have been smaller in scope than in previous years. Third, smaller exercises mean less justification to obtain a commercial charter vessel, or a Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessel to meet requirements (other than for movement of exercise munitions), which leads to more and more 100% commercial operations where cargo is containerized or flat-racked under the USC from seaport to seaport, unloaded and trucked to exercise sites. Fourth, NMP is too shallow (28 feet)¹⁰ and its turning radius is too small (700 feet) to accommodate most modern Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) vessels in the commercial and military inventory. Lastly, the Marines contracted a High Speed Vessel (HSV), the West Pac Express (WPE)¹¹ which is berthed at NMP and used to move exercise cargo (32,000 square feet or RO/RO capacity) and up to 900 passengers to and from exercise sites. The operational disadvantage of the WPE is its straight ramp at the stern that can't slew to allow loading or discharging at a pier or berth, only at an L shaped berth.¹² NMP berth 5 is L Shaped and meets WPE requirements. The USMC has contract options on the WPE until 2012.

Import	#Vessels	Pieces	MTs	Export	#Vessels	Pieces	MTs
1999	15	251	43059	1999	14	272	49429
2000	16	301	41359	2000	13	377	26906
2001	17	487	30348	2001	13	446	40572
2002	10	333	32601	2002	10	368	25194
2003	12	526	83470	2003	14	649	77119
2004	11	459	55029	2004	9	515	38088
2005	8	362	43015	2005	9	551	40552
2006	11	463	47886	2006	9	325	24428
2007	10	411	29049	2007	12	460	20263
2008	9	216	10005	2008	10	276	14464
TOTAL	119	3809	415821	TOTAL	113	4239	357015

Table 2: NMP Workload Statistics

Tengan Pier, located near USMC Base Camp Courtney, is used for import and export in support of ammunition operations. The Pier is 100 feet wide, 806 feet long and the water depth is 36 feet. Because of the height of the pier, it is more suited for Break Bulk (BB) operations in support of small exercises than any RO/RO operation. The staging area at this pier is limited, and the site is often subject to protesters, who are against military operations.¹³ Table 3 shows the last ten years workload statistics of Tengan Pier.¹⁴

Import	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs	Export	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs
1999	8	177	7165	1999	6	95	11559
2000	1	4	128	2000	1	12	384
2001	4	122	3218	2001	3	66	1914
2002	5	119	4615	2002	5	47	9150
2003	5	64	5060	2003	2	75	3404
2004	4	37	1434	2004	3	213	7104
2005	2	205	6726	2005	2	140	4760
2006	3	28	952	2006	2	21	705
2007	4	152	6826	2007	5	270	8731
2008	4	191	6424	2008	4	81	2629
TOTAL	40	1099	42548	TOTAL	33	1020	50340

Table 3: Tengan Pier Workload Statistics

White Beach is a Naval Base having both a Navy and Army Pier. The Army Pier is used mostly for bulk fuel receipt, but could be used in support of small exercise deployments and redeployments with advance coordination. Most fuel vessels arrive from mainland Japan with at least seven to ten days notice and are discharged within three to five hours.¹⁵ Most scheduled exercise deployment and redeployment windows for Okinawa are known months in advance and usually completed within an eight hour shift, so berthing can be de-conflicted. In 2007 White Beach Army Pier was used only 69 days,¹⁶ so additional cargo operations are feasible. Limiting factors of the White Beach Army Pier are the length of (612 feet), depth of water at the pier (28 feet), pier width (80 feet), fuel hook ups on the pier could be damaged by Lift-On/Lift-Off (LO/LO) or RO/RO operations, available vehicle staging is very limited and the road network to and from White Beach is narrow and congested. The Navy East Pier is superior in length (977 feet), depth (35 feet) and pier width (100 feet). SDDC indicates that the Navy Pier could handle a Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR)¹⁷ vessel.¹⁸ Table 4 shows the ten year history on White Beach cargo operations.¹⁹

Import	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs	Export	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs
1999	0	0	0	1999	0	0	0
2000	1	0	1241	2000	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	2001	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	2002	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	2003	0	0	0
2004	1	2	68	2004	1	276	27459
2005	0	0	0	2005	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	2006	1	40	1941
2007	1	57	3618	2007	1	298	11393
2008	0	0	0	2008	0	0	0
TOTAL	3	59	4927	TOTAL	3	614	40793

Table 4: White Beach Cargo Operation Statistics

NPICT receives over 7,500 import and over 600 export DoD containers annually for Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES), Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), House Hold Goods (HHGs) and Service repair parts. DoD is NPICTs largest single customer by revenue.²⁰ The port opened its first 1,000 foot berth in 1997 and its second 1,000 foot berth in 2006. The seaport channel and berths are dredged to 46-50 feet in depth and are able to handle the largest vessels made to include a Navy carrier. The port equipment is new; road access is excellent; stadium lighting is superior; and it maintains over two million square feet of paved staging and eight hundred thousand square feet in gravel staging. Physical security is enhanced by the fact that three sides of the seaport are surrounded by water, and is several miles off the main road, and out of view of normal traffic, and the public. It also has Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and motion detector sensors on the perimeter fence.



Figure 1: NPICT Aerial Photo

NPICT currently maintains two 40-ton overhead gantry cranes and will add two more cranes if workload ever increases enough to justify the additional expense. The current port utilization rate is 15% and there is no indication this will increase anytime soon. If the two additional cranes were installed at current import and export rates, it would drop the port productivity utilization rate to a mere 7.5% of capability.²¹ NPICT is approximately two miles north of NMP and two miles South of United States Marine Corps (USMC) Base Camp Kinser. A minimum amount of oversized cargo is shipped through this port via containerized flat-racks and will be discussed later in this paper under “Restriction of War like Materials.” Table 5 depicts container statistics for NPICT over the last ten years.²²

Import	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs	Export	#Vessels	CNTRS	MTs
1999	202	8508	317402	1999	134	483	16666
2000	195	8581	320315	2000	123	751	26442
2001	163	8339	309162	2001	122	808	27056
2002	150	8360	297723	2002	118	673	20754
2003	162	8522	292047	2003	75	631	19559
2004	139	8251	279456	2004	67	576	18663
2005	146	7824	262438	2005	88	830	27529
2006	126	8087	276838	2006	87	737	24367
2007	84	8046	268423	2007	93	570	19242
2008	65	6742	232123	2008	75	593	24838
TOTAL	1432	81260	2855927	TOTAL	982	6652	225116

Table 5: NPICT Container Statistics

Outsourcing of Non Corp Competencies

The first of the fourteen areas of discussion is Issue #1: Global POV Contract (GPC). When the GPC was implemented worldwide in 1998, both SDDC Battalion Commands in Japan (Yokohama and Okinawa) were opted out of participating in the contract. The justification was that Japan had a small workload of POV shipments²³ (mostly within Japan from Okinawa to the Mainland) due to the restrictions placed on

US vehicles from being imported to Japan. Despite the low averages of POVs shipped every week, SDDC maintains full time employees to manage the POV shipment operations. This oversight raises the overall costs for shipping a POV. A commercially operated Vehicle Processing Center (VPC) at one of the major bases, even if opened only one day a week would mitigate facility costs as well as the personnel costs leaving only the actual contractor cost of POV shipments (see Table 6).

Year	Import	Export	Total
2008	57	153	210
2007	54	131	185
2006	65	156	221
2005	75	151	226
2004	94	216	310
2003	121	206	327
2002	111	205	316
2001	143	269	412
2000	117	225	342
1999	103	140	243

Table 6: POV Statistics²⁴

Issue #2: Stevedore & Related Terminal Services (S&RTS) contracts. Most SDDC Terminals eliminated Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to streamline capital overhead, and reduce maintenance costs and liability risks to the command. However, SDDC Okinawa not only provides Material Handling Equipment (MHE) in the form of forklifts, but they also provide the maintenance for this equipment.²⁵ These costs are covered by SDDC, and not by the stevedore contract. With diminishing annual workload levels, the justification to continue this practice is reduced. The capital and maintenance costs are excessive given the current workload and should be tied back to the stevedore contract as other SDDC commands are doing.²⁶ Cost aside, there

is a liability issue if there is a forklift accident or injury, it could come back against either SDDC or IMCOM who maintains the forklifts vice the stevedore contractor.

SDDC also let their S&RTS for a ten year period with yearly increases of 3%. Most SDDC S&RTS contracts are let for a two year period with three one year option periods.²⁷ Re-competing contracts often is good for competition. Re-awarding contracts allows SDDC and the contractor to address changes in the industry, requirements, and workload projections. SDDC requires efficient and effective stevedore labor on demand.

Issue #3: Under Pacific Command (PACOM) Instruction 4600.3K there is no standardization for Common User Land Transportation (CULT).²⁸ On mainland Japan, CULT is managed by the U. S. Army Garrison-Japan; in Okinawa, Japan, it's managed by SDDC; in Hawaii it's managed by U.S. Army Garrison and in Korea it is managed by the 25th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control). In Japan, two different organizations should not have split responsibility for the same function. Lastly, the predominate DoD Service user is usually assigned by the Theater Commander as the CULT manager.²⁹ In this case, the United States Marine Corps is the largest user on Okinawa with approximately 50% of the workload, followed by DeCA with 30% and the Army with 14%.³⁰

Issue #4: Elimination of the NMP Break-Bulk-Point (BBP) as a shipping location for multipack containers. On 15 May 08, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) opened a Defense Distribution Command (DDC) Depot on Camp Kinser for the receipt, storage and issue of common user class IX parts for the Services. NMP averaged eight DLA multipack containers a week, but this workload is now diverted to the DDC depot.³¹

There are cost advantages of un-stuffing at a DDC depot. First, DDC uses their own in-house vice contract labor which is cheaper. Second, they already have standing transportation delivery routes to the island customers in support of Service supply request demands. This prevents special trucks from being ordered for delivery as was the case at NMP. The DDC depot at Camp Kinser is the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point (TCSP) for all of Okinawa.

Other, non DLA multi-pack containers should also be booked to the DDC to piggyback off the labor and transportation savings or booked as multi-stop containers. Because the major customers on Okinawa are within twenty miles of the commercial seaport, it is an ideal location for multi-stop container load planning by shippers. Sending a container multi-stop is more cost efficient than sending it to SDDC's Break Bulk Point (BBP) where the container is unstuffed by stevedore contractors, the cargo inventoried, stored in a warehouse and consolidated, later trucks are ordered and the cargo is loaded on trucks for delivery to the customer. This process not only increases the Customer Wait Time (CWT), but usually more than triples the cost to the tax payer by double handling the cargo with contract labor and paying for the transportation delivery twice. Lastly, multi-pack containers could also be unstuffed at NPICT and put on CULT assets for delivery. These DDC capabilities and other options eliminate the requirement for SDDC to maintain a BBP. This concept follows the same model as SDDC in Korea after Defense Distribution Depot Korea (DDDK) was stood up in 2005.³² Operationally, it reduces the NMP and their stevedore workload but increases cost saving and efficiency, while reducing CWT.

Cost Avoidance

Issue #5: Evaluation of the Infrastructure at NMP. “NMP no longer meets the demands of a modern port facility. The current basin width and depth prevent vessels longer than 700 feet and with a draft greater than 26 feet from entering. Most of the work-horse ships of the strategic sealift program (military and civilian) exceed these dimensions and cannot access NMP, complicating strategic planning. The ocean shipping industry continues to grow and lessen the capability of NMP.”³³ The two restrictions identified make NMP marginal in a strategic sense as it allows very few vessels (only 23% of MSC’s current fleet) access.³⁴ Neither an LMSR, the cornerstone of the strategic sealift program, nor a Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) could berth at NMP due to their lengths and drafts. Figure 2 below shows the narrow channel leading into the port. The lower half of the photo shows the NMP side, which has the four angled main berths and a fifth berth in the middle right photo. No ammunition operations are authorized at this seaport. The main road to the airport passes along the seaport and is often a location for reporters and protesters to photograph equipment discharge, loading or staging operations. With these limitations, it is harder and harder for SDDC to let a Request for Proposal (RFP) to contract sealift as most of the smaller, less cost effective vessels are no longer in the commercial inventory. The restrictions make it more difficult for SDDC to support the war fighter deployment timelines in a confident or efficient manner. None of the vessels in the Army’s Afloat Preposition Squadron (APS3) or the USMC’s Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPS) can berth at NMP due to both vessel draft and length.³⁵ These vessels are loaded with military equipment and sustainment supplies and are anchored in Guam, Saipan and Diego Garcia; they

remain on standby to support Combatant Commanders' contingency and humanitarian requirements worldwide.



Figure 2: Naha Military Port (NMP) Perimeter

Issue 6: Force Protection Concerns for NMP. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA) are conducted periodically at locations throughout the world.

“From 21-27 October 2006 NMP was inspected and cited for having nine vulnerabilities that needed correction to bring the facility into compliance with DoD Standard 16.

Unfortunately, most of these deficiencies are not easy to correct or require a great deal of funding and cooperation with outside organizations.”³⁶ If you own a seaport, either military, commercial or private, you are responsible for the waterside, pier side, perimeter fence, cargo yards, ware houses, sensitive cargo holding areas and Access Control Points (ACP) security, which is very expensive to maintain 24/7/365. With decreased workload going through NMP in peacetime and limited operational use physically possible in contingencies, it becomes increasingly expensive to maintain and

keep secure a legacy facility when other more viable options are readily available or possible. When a commercial facility is used to ship DoD cargo, the normal operating expense is only the S&RTS contractor costs for charter vessels, or the USC rates for cargo going via liner service vessels.³⁷

Issue 7: Infrastructure and facility maintenance costs are high. SDDC's own assessment is that NMP is ill-suited for strategic operations. Both the GOJ and US taxpayer are paying large recurring bills to maintain this legacy infrastructure facility. Table 7 shows the past three year costs for maintaining NMP. Some costs, such as security and fire department personnel are paid by the GOJ, but are manpower assets the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) Garrison could reprogram for higher priority requirements on Okinawa. Due to the poor state of NMP facilities, the maintenance costs alone have been averaging one and a half million dollars per year.

Cost Description	FY06 Costs	FY07 Costs	FY08 Costs
Electrical	\$210,700	\$238,000	\$249,316
Water	\$150,900	\$145,000	\$155,740
Sewage	\$78,100	\$66,100	\$84,228
Refuse Collection	\$42,100	\$20,000	\$16,695
Custodial	\$28,700	\$26,000	\$12,900
Ground Maintenance	\$24,542	\$24,910	24,590
DPW In-House Supplies	\$24,327	\$24,692	\$24,375
Hazardous waste	\$200	\$0	\$180
Environmental Projects	0	0	\$106,350
Security (23 pax)	\$695,000	\$716,000	\$737,480
Fire Department (12 pax)	\$305,000	\$312,000	\$469,563
DOL Forklift Repair Parts	\$12,769	\$12,622	\$14,221
DOL Labor Support (7 pax)	\$260,497	\$266,721	\$272,362
DPW Labor Support (7 pax)	\$260,497	\$266,721	\$273,362
NMP Maintenance Costs	\$1,130,969	\$1,772,000	\$1,611,309
Total Costs	\$3,224,301	\$3,890,766	\$4,053,571

Table 7: NMP Annual Infrastructure and Maintenance Cost³⁸

Issue #8 Dredging does not solve the vessel accessibility problem for NMP. SDDC has been working for years to get NMP dredged at an estimated cost of \$14 million.³⁹ This is a flawed strategy; even if you could get funding to dredge NMP, it doesn't eliminate the restriction on the 700 foot turning radius. The agencies requested to provide dredging funding are not aware of the other operational restrictions to NMP. Dredging is a recurring problem at NMP. In this case, even if dredging occurred, it is doubtful that it could increase cargo throughput for the customer base in either peacetime or contingency.

Increase War Fighter Support Readiness

Issue #9: The GOJ allows local politicians to impose restrictions on shipments of warlike materials (green cargo) through commercial seaports. This issue has been an operational problem for SDDC and United States Forces Japan (USFJ) for over 20 years. It is a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to restrict DoD imports.⁴⁰ These restrictions cost American forces both time and increased shipment costs. "In 2006 alone it cost DoD an additional \$434,000 to send 1-1 ADA Battalion (Patriot) through NMP via a chartered vessel vice through NPICT booked on a liner service vessel."⁴¹ This restriction also goes against the 2005 United States/Japan Allies: Transformation and Realignment for the future where both parties stated they want to increase cooperation in areas such as transportation and seaports matters.⁴² This restriction needs to be addressed, challenged and eliminated to resolve operational and contingency throughput issues, while immediately achieving transportation cost savings.

Issue #10: Naha Military Port Replacement Facility (NMPRF) see figure 3. The proposed location of this new facility is in front of USMC Base Camp Kinser (which is scheduled to be closed and relocated on the island in conjunction with all the other base realignment moves).⁴³ Due to the NMP limitations discussed already, NMPRF has been under discussion for over thirty years. Completion of NMPRF is predicted to be twenty years in the future. The GOJ cost is approximately \$600 million in today's dollars to develop this new seaport and industrial park.⁴⁴ However, the requirements for DoD changed over the last 30 years and may not be fully understood by the GOJ. SDDC only needs access to and control of a seaport facility for as little as 48 hours to conduct operations. There is excess requirements capacity built in the NMPRF, which is designed to simultaneously berth: two LMSR's, one FSS, one Cape H Class vessel and one T-ACS6 for a total of five vessels discharging or loading. The more realistic requirement for either peacetime or contingency is only one berth. NMPRF also calls for warehouses for storage (which are obsolete due to containerization) and a POV operation, which has been discussed already and appears excessive given the current requirements. MSC has the same issues as SDDC; they need access when required to allow their vessels to berth to take on stores (water & food). However, MSC maintains options as it can continue to use NMP, can use White Beach, Tengan Pier or even NPICT under the right agreement scenarios. This could lead NMP to transition to a combined use facility with GoJ in the lead, as DoD conducts less operations there and spends less revenue on upkeep.⁴⁵ Lastly, this could allow an earlier full transfer of NMP back to the GOJ, which would be seen as a success to the GOJ/DoD relations.




Figure 3: Artist's Depiction of Completed NMP Replacement Facility.

Issue 11: Proposed NMPRF Alternate COA. In lieu of building a \$600 million dollar facility (which is probably more than twenty years from completion), another option would be for the GOJ to build berth #11 at NPICT and turn it over to DoD for operational use. Construction on this berth could start quickly and would be an estimated 5-10%⁴⁶ of the cost of constructing the NMPRF proposed in Figure 3. An additional advantage would be that berth 11 could also have access to the gantry cranes from berths 9 and 10 when required. The advantage to the GOJ would be in meeting US base realignment objectives sooner and at less cost than programmed. Okinawa officials could get back NMP for commercial development much sooner. DoD would have access to a facility that meets all their operational, exercise and contingency requirements as well being more economical to maintain. Figure 4 depicts the location of berth 11 in relation to NMP, NPICT and Camp Kinser.




Figure 4: NMPRF Alternate Seaport Recommendation

Summary of the perceived stakeholder positions concerning NMP, NPICT and NMPRF. The key stakeholder positions as follows: USFJ requires access to seaports to meet operational, sustainment (AAFES, DeCA and repair parts), exercise and contingency requirements; the GOJ desires to support USFJ in conjunction with the SOFA and any other bilateral agreements; Okinawa Area Prefecture (OAP) would like NMP returned so they can develop it and would also like the GOJ to fund building an alternate NMPRF; III MEF wants to be able to deploy or redeploy its forces on a Time Definite Delivery (TDD) schedule; SDDC requires secure office space, communications and access to seaports to execute their mission; SDDC employees desire a status quo to ensure good job security; SDDC stevedore contractor desires a status quo; NPICT already moves 100% of DoD sustainment cargo and can accommodate more workload if it was offered as they are operating at only 15% of capacity;⁴⁷ USAG-J provides facility

maintenance support to NMP and would support implementing changes to decrease overhead and recurring costs where feasible.⁴⁸

Issue 12: There is no Explosive Quantity Distance (ESQD) survey for NPICT.⁴⁹ SDDC should work with 83rd OD Bn to conduct an ESQD survey and initiate a draft ammunition event waiver for NPICT for 750,000 lbs.⁵⁰ This waiver could allow an MPS or APS vessel to berth for exercises or contingency operations. By completing the ESQD survey and waiver in advance, it will facilitate actual execution in the future for peacetime exercise, deployment or contingency operations rather than starting from scratch. A model to follow is the Korea Theater of Operation (KTO) where from 2004-2006 the theater was able to complete four ESQD surveys (Gwangyang, Mokpo, Gunsan, and Pyongteak) and obtain six ammunition event waivers. With the waivers, SDDC was able to conduct proof of concept demonstrations at Gwangyang Seaport for an APS3 discharge and trans-load;⁵¹ at Mokpo seaport for a MPS discharge⁵² and load-back and further proof of concept event waivers at Gunsan and Pyongteak seaports for an MPS vessel. These event waivers and proof of concept exercises were very important as they led to operational and contingency changes in current planning documents as well as familiarized these commercial seaports with military operations. Later, because of the successful proof of concept exercises, the theater was able to get approval for an event waiver for 3.5 million pounds at Gwangyang seaport in order to execute a containerized ammunition discharge. Incremental steps over time will change attitudes, instill cooperation and improve readiness.

Issue 13: There is no long term strategy to test using alternate seaports in Okinawa. Proof of concept exercises should be conducted at NPICT, Tengan Pier and

White Beach.⁵³ For NPICT, SDDC has several options. First, they need to start booking oversized cargo via the USC to force the warlike material restriction issue to the surface with the GOJ. Second, they need to let an RFP to load or discharge cargo at NPICT to further test these limitations. Third, they should work with MSC and the United States Navy (USN) to bring in an APS3 or MPS3 vessel for a port call. For White Beach and Tengan Piers, SDDC can simply coordinate the RFP for an exercise deployment.

Issue 14: Leveraging Naval Port Calls to NPICT. Economic concerns vice the US Military presence, is now the number one issue in Okinawa.⁵⁴ The best approach in affecting change in access to commercial seaports should be through economic incentives. An example, “from October 26-30, 2007, the American Carrier USS KITTY HAWK and the Destroyer, USS FITZGERALD conducted a Port Call at Muroran, Hokkaido, Japan. The Muroran Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) released a statement in early December stating that the visit generated \$2.9 million in revenue to the local community as 5,300 Sailors and 23,300 Japanese visited the vessels and bought items from local vendors.”⁵⁵ By working with the local authorities, the US can work to achieve its objectives, which at the same time can build relationships and help the local economy.

Recommendations

First, outsourcing non-core competencies will make SDDC more efficient and provide additional expeditionary flexibility to their manpower for short-term or long-term reorganization. The changes identified will help standardize the missions with other SDDC Battalions in operations (POV GPC), contracting (GFE) and in distribution (CULT and the elimination of NMP BBP (multipack container un-stuffing operations).

Second, cost avoidance. Due to changes in vessel size and the commercial industry, it has made some of our military seaport infrastructure inadequate to support current military requirements. When this is the case, such as at NMP, SDDC needs to educate other stakeholders and mitigate current spending (FP, security, infrastructure maintenance and dredging). NMP is legacy infrastructure for SDDC due to its port limitations, out of date warehouses, deteriorating offices and an excess BBP operation. It's costing millions annually just to maintain NMP and these levels will be difficult to sustain in the future. New infrastructure funding should focus on an alternative HQs location such as Torii Station. With vessel operations as infrequent as they are (once a month at NMP) a permanent 24/7/365 presence at NMP for SDDC is not required. After all, SDDC conducts operations at White Beach, Tengan Pier and NPICT and does not maintain a 24/7/365 presence there. Additionally, SDDC often deploys to Thailand and the Philippines, conducts deployment and redeployment operations and returns without maintaining a permanent presence. What SDDC needs is unrestricted cargo access to adequate commercial facilities when required for short periods of time. In that way, they are not paying for security, electricity, water, facilities maintenance, fire department support etc.

Third and finally, supporting the war fighter readiness requirements is the primary responsibility of SDDC. Maximizing cargo through put and minimizing CWT is a standing mandate on behalf of all customers. To accomplish this mission, SDDC needs to provide the customers with as many shipping, deployment or redeployment options as possible to ensure flexibility in execution and meeting TDD requirements. In the short term, SDDC needs to do everything possible to increase the war fighter readiness

(gain unrestricted cargo access of NPICT and completion of an ESQD survey). In the long term, SDDC needs to educate the stakeholders on the minimum NMPRF requirements so this initiative can move forward faster and cheaper than currently programmed.

Conclusion

As a result of the modernization and streamlining of the international shipping industry over the past 50 years, Naha Military Port's operational usefulness in the projection and sustainment of U.S. strategic power is extremely limited. The discussion above offers a roadmap for improving regional warfighter support through the outsourcing of non-core competencies, a reduction in recurring annual facility maintenance costs, and the mitigation of long-term security risks. In the end these actions would increase throughput and TDD capability while at the same time improving the efficiency and expeditionary capabilities for SDDC operations at Okinawa, Japan.

There are certainly other stakeholders involved in executing parts of these recommendations. It is SDDC's responsibility to educate and lead these partners, who may not understand the business end of seaport operations, in recognizing the impact of today's shipping business environment on achieving our operational requirements.

Endnotes

¹ George Raine, "Containerization Changed Shipping Industry Forever," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 10 February 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/259042_containerships10.html (accessed 27 Nov 2008).

² Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), "Mission Statement," SDDC Home Page at <http://www.sddc.army.mil/Public/Home/About%20SDDC/Mission%20Statement> (accessed on November 20, 2008).

³ Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), "Stevedoring and Related Terminal Services (S&RTS)," May 13, 2008, S&RTS contracts require the contractor to arrange for stevedoring services, including material and equipment, except those materials specified as Government Furnished, in accordance with the Schedule Notes of the Request for Proposal (RFP) and Performance Work Statement (PWS) of the Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) to load and discharge DoD cargo from commercial and military vessels. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=41573c9e78005c823812b4ce4ca14c08&tab=core&_cview=0 (accessed on December 17, 2008)

⁴ Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), "Universal Service Contract (USC) 05," linked from the SDDC homepage at <http://www.sddc.army.mil/sddc/Content/Pub/38059/USC05%20Contract.pdf> (accessed on November 4, 2008).

⁵ Flatracks consist of a floor structure with a high loading capacity composed of a steel frame and a softwood floor and two end walls, which may either be fixed or collapsible. The end walls are stable enough to allow cargo securing means to be attached and several flatracks to be stacked on top of one another. Flatracks are available in 20' and 40' sizes. A number of lashing rings, to which the cargo may be secured, are installed in the side rails, the corner posts and the floor. The lashing rings may take loads of up to 2000 kg in the case of 20' flatracks or up to 4,000 kg in the case of 40' flatracks. Some types of 20' flatracks have forklift pockets. 40' flatracks have gooseneck tunnels at each end. In addition, they are sometimes equipped with lashing winches with 2 metric ton lashing belts. Transportation-Information Service, "Flatracks version 1.1.0.05," http://www.tis-gdv.de/tis_e/containers/arten/flat/flat.htm (accessed December 17 2008)

⁶ The factors leading to the GPC decision were the overall increase in the booking of containerized POVs on the numerous commercial carriers which provided a Time Definite Delivery (TDD) to the customer; decreases in scheduling and, thus POV shipping by Break-Bulk (BB), Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) vessels; decreased costs of containerization shipping vice break-bulk shipping; and finally this contract provided that both the government and the customer could quickly file claims against the carrier in the event of damage or loss. Awarding the contract to a single carrier meant the government did not have to prove where damage occurred from point of origin to point of destination when numerous subcontractors were involved in actual shipments. Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), "Personal property / POV, Global POV Contract, Attachment 1 to DAMJ01-03-D-184, Performance Work Statement (PWS)," <http://www.sddc.army.mil/sddc/content/pub> (accessed on November 27 2008)

⁷ The 1995 BRAC forced the closure of the Bayonne, New Jersey and Oakland, California Area Commands, which were consolidated at Fort Eustis, Virginia with the standing up of the Deployment Support Command (DSC). The 2005 BRAC forced the movement of the SDDC HQs from Alexandria, Virginia to Scott, AFB in 2007. In 2010, The G3 and remaining sections at Fort Eustis will move into their new HQs at Scott, AFB. Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC), "Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Historical Overview," 2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/mtmc> (accessed on 9 October 2008)

⁸ LCDR Alex Soe, email message to author, November, 05, 2008, "Characteristics of Okinawa Seaports, Table 1." The author prepared the table and draft data and it was confirmed by LCDR Soe. LCDR Soe is the Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC) in Okinawa, Japan.

⁹ Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 3, 2008, "Naha Military Port (NMP), Workload Statistics, Table 2," The author created the table and Mr. Day coordinated for the population of the data fields. Mr. Day is the 599th Transportation Group, Deputy Operations Officer.

¹⁰ A general rule of thumb is 10% of the vessels deepest draft from under-keel clearance or a minimum of two feet of clearance; the maximum draft of a tanker vessel entering Naha Military Port (NMP) Harbor can be approximately 26 feet with a harbor depth of 28 feet. United States Coast Guard, "Code Federal Regulation (157.455)," <http://www.mxsocal.org/pdf/Chap%20XIV%20Underkeel%20Clearance.pdf> (accessed on January 16, 2009).

¹¹ Military Sealift Command (MSC), "High Speed Vessel (HSV) West PAC Express," <http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=169&type=HighSpeedVessel> (accessed on December 18, 2008).

¹² The WestPac Express has a stern ramp so backs into an L shaped berth in order to discharge its cargo. Straight ramp vessels can't be discharged on piers or container berths as the ramp isn't able to pivot to the pier. The WPE is the only HSV currently used by DoD with a straight stern ramp. Wikipedia, *Jane's Defense Weekly*, November 19, 2008, page 5, [http://wn.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Westpac_Express_\(HSV-4676\)](http://wn.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Westpac_Express_(HSV-4676)) (accessed December 17, 2008)

¹³ LTC Todd Wolf, e-mail message to author, December 22, 2008. Colonel Wolf was the Commander, 835th Transportation Battalion (SDDC) from January, 2004 to March, 2006.

¹⁴ Ron Day, e-mail to the author, November 22, 2008, "Okinawa Seaport Workload Statistics, Table 3." Author prepared the table and Mr. Day coordinated for the population of the data fields. Mr. Day is the 599th Transportation Group, Deputy Operations Officer.

¹⁵ MAJ Devon NuDelman, e-mail message to the author, Jan 8, 2009. Major NuDelman was the S3 and XO of the 505th Quartermaster Battalion located in Okinawa, Japan from 2006 to 2008.

¹⁶ LCDR Alex Soe, e-mail message to author, November 4, 2008, "Okinawa Vessel Berthing Characteristics." Lieutenant Commander Soe is the Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC) in Okinawa, Japan.

¹⁷ A Large Medium Speed Ro-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessel is approximately 950 feet long and has a draft of 33-35 feet, and can carry 300-400K square feet of cargo; it is the cornerstone of the DOD sealift program. DOD bases its requirements for strategic mobility forces on the 1992 congressionally mandated analysis called the Mobility Requirements Study. The study established a requirement for an additional 3 million square feet of surge capacity and 2 million square feet of preposition capacity by fiscal year 1998. The study recommended that DOD acquire 20 LMSR ships, 9 for prepositioning, and 11 for surge to meet this requirement. In the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update, DOD validated the study's recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to buy 19 LMSR ships and established a 10 million square feet of surge capability and 4 million square feet of prepositioned capacity for a total of 14 million square feet. General Accounting Office (GAO), "*Strategic Mobility: Late Deliveries of Large, Medium Speed Roll-On-Off Ships (LMSR)*," (Washington, DC; General Accounting Office, June 1997).

¹⁸ The author inquired as to studies or and recent rehearsals of cargo throughput at the Navy Pier. No rehearsal to evaluate the alignment of the vessel ramps to the Navy Pier were conducted since pier renovation in 2006-2007. It is unknown if the vessel ramps can adequately facilitate discharge operations, and no comparative productivity discharge, or load rates are unavailable. Ron Day, e-mail message to author, February 12, 2009

¹⁹ Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2008, "Okinawa Seaport Workload Statistics for White Beach, Table 4."

²⁰ Aviana Detmongkhonh, e-mail message to author, March 26, 2007. Mrs. Detmongkhonh is the Chief, Traffic Management Division, 835th Transportation Battalion (SDDC), Okinawa, Japan.

²¹ Akira Chiba, Okinawa, Japan, interviewed by author, Naha Port International Container Terminal (NPICT), April 08, 2007; Captain Chiba is the General Manager of NPICT and met with the author on two occasions and confirmed throughput productivity rate computations.

²² Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2008, "Okinawa Seaport Workload Statistics for NPICT, Table 5," November 22, 2008.

²³ Ron Day, 599th Transportation Group, Hawaii, telephone interview by author, December 22, 2008. Mr. Day worked for Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) in Japan at the time the Global POV Contract was being implemented.

²⁴ Ron Day, e-mail message to author, November 17, 2008. "Okinawa Seaport Workload Statistics for Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs)," Table 6.

²⁵ IMCOM maintains these forklifts and bills SDDC for repair parts, which were \$14,221 in FY2008. The overall cost could be as high as \$100,000 annually after Japanese labor is included, but this labor is provided and paid by the GoJ, but a cost no less. Steven Shelton, e-mail message to author, July 22, 2007. "Naha Military Port (NMP) Maintenance and Facility Costs," Steven Shelton is the Resource Manager, US Army Garrison, Okinawa.

²⁶ Schedule 3, Longshoremen & Equipment Operator Table shows 4,500 hours of estimated forklift operator requirements; schedule for list forklift equipment usage of 1,850 hours total by several types of forklifts, average cost is approximately \$40 per hour so at \$100,000 of maintenance cost would translate to 2,500 hours of contract forklift costs. United States Air Force (USAF), 18th Wing Contract Command, "Contract F62321-03-D-007," October 1, 2003.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Common user Land Transportation (CULT) provides common use transportation such as flatbed trucks or low boy trailers for all Services if they have requirements that exceed their organic capabilities. Pacific Command (PACOM), "Instruction 4600.3K, subject: Common User Transportation in PACOM."

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ MAJ Shane Barnes, e-mail to author, January 28, 2007. MAJ Barnes was the Executive Officer of the 835th Transportation Battalion from 2006 to 2008.

³¹ Larry J. Collignon, e-mail message to author, November 18, 2008. Mr. Collignon was a former Commander, 599th Transportation Group and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) G4. He is currently working at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) as a Defense Contractor and oversaw the implementation of the Defense Depot Command (DDC) test on Okinawa.

³² Hui C. Son, "Distribution of Multipack Containers," January 31, 2005. Dr. Son is the Chief, Traffic Management Division, 837th Transportation Battalion, Busan, South Korea.

³³ "LTC Jonathan E. Watson, "Statement of Requirement (or Operational Needs Document)," May 10, 2007, quote is paragraph 4e, Memorandum from the Commander, 835th Transportation Battalion (SDDC) to Commander, US Army Garrison-Japan.

³⁴ Carlos Tibbets, e-mail message to author, January 5, 2009. Mr. Tibbets is the Chief, Traffic Management Division, 836th Transportation Battalion (SDDC), Yokohama, Japan.

³⁵ Globalsecurity.org, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/sealift-mps.htm>, (accessed on October 21, 2008)

³⁶ Watson.

³⁷ Liner service is a commercial ocean carrier service that operates on a fixed route calling the same ports on a regularly scheduled basis, i.e. weekly.

³⁸ John Buesse e-mail message to author, February 12, 2009. John Buesse is the Director Plans, Training and Security (DPTS) for the U.S. Army Garrison, Okinawa, Japan. The cost information was consolidated by the Chief, RM Steve Shelton and his staff.

³⁹ GEN Norman Schwartz, e-mail to COL Prescott Marshall, October 18, 2006 and forwarded to the author by a third party. "200603563: Commander Interest: Dredging Requirements at Naha Port" discusses desire to support dredging and monitor the situation with the GOJ.

⁴⁰ The GOJ has allowed local mayors to set restrictions on movement of this "green" cargo in violation of Article XI, paragraph 2 of the US/GOJ Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which states "All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United States Armed Forces will be permitted entry into Japan and free of customs duties and other charges." Oyadomari, Yasuharu, Naha Mayor, subject: Handling of War-Like Material at Naha Port Area (Response) September 18, 1989.

⁴¹ Alan T. Nakai, "Memorandum for the Joint Entry and Exit Committee, subject: Use of Japanese Commercial Seaports," November 15, 2007.

⁴² "Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation; supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling; transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV); transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other related activities for non combatant evaluation operations (NEO); use of seaport and airport facilities, road water space and airspace, and frequency bands." Security Consultative Committee Document, "U.S. – Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," October 29

2005, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>, (accessed on October 22, 2008).

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ LTC Richard A. Davis, e-mail message to the author, November 14, 2008. LTC Davis previously served as the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) J42 Facilities Engineer Branch, Yokota, Japan. He is currently serving in Iraq and after his tour he will serve for the Army Corps of Engineers at Camp Zama, Japan.

⁴⁵ Currently, NMP is a Joint use facility, but with the US in the lead and GoJ Coast Guard as a user. This agreement was signed on February 28, 1980 and is updated every 3 years. Addendum #9 to agreement, Control AJO-80-020, For the Joint Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas by the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, June 12, 2007.

⁴⁶ The basic price of a berth is about \$35 million, each gantry crane is about \$5 million (\$10 million for 2) and staging area cranes run \$1 million for four, refrigeration is about \$2 million as are all the buildings for a total of about \$50 million per berth if all the extras are purchased. Jose R. Rosal, email message to author, December 27, 2008. Mr. Rosal is the Gwangyang Bay Area Free Economic Zone Authority Marketing and Public Relations Associate Director, Gwangyang, South Korea. It is the authors opinion that no gantry or staging area cranes (designed for container operations), or refrigerated plugs are required to support military operations.

⁴⁷ Chiba.

⁴⁸ John Buesse, e-mail message to author, December 16, 2008.

⁴⁹ An ESQD Survey is a document and map that lists all the buildings, their value, the distance from the hazard (ship berth in this example) and the day and night times number of people working in each of the buildings. A separate computation is made for a blast radius of a given quantity of a hazardous material. The arc is draw around the buildings to determine personnel and equipment within the computed blast area. The purpose of the ESQD is to safeguard personnel, equipment, ammunition and public or private property in the event of an explosion or fire. The Ordnance Shop, "Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) Requirements," Document not dated. <http://www.ordnance.org/esqd.htm> (accessed on December 17, 2008)

⁵⁰ The event waiver process is designed to allow commanders to meet critical operational requirements by obtaining authorization in a timely manner to deviate from established explosives safety standards for a non-recurring event. When deviations from explosives safety criteria are for a recurring event, issuance of a standing waiver or exemption from criteria is required. 750,000 pounds was chosen as it covers the majority of APS and MPS cargo carrying vessels. Navy Safety Center, Explosive Safety Event Waiver Requests," July 26, 2002, <http://www.nablc.navy.mil/safety/eventwaivers.htm> (accessed on January 16, 2009)

⁵¹ LTG Charles C. Campbell, "Request for Event Waiver to AR 385-64, U.S. Army Explosives Safety program for Gwangyang Port, KIT New Berth, Gwangyang City, Republic of South Korea," August 30, 2004. EQSD survey was completed by Alfred Voelkelt 6th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). The event waiver was required because the APS3 vessel USNS Watson

was carrying ammunition with a Net Explosive Weight (NEW) of 750,000. It needed to discharge a portion of its cargo to another vessel bound for Iraq. Lieutenant General Campbell signed the waiver as the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army (EUSA).

⁵² LTG Charles C. Campbell, "Explosive Event Waiver Request for Mokpo Newport, Mokpo City, Republic of South Korea," March 2, 2006. EQSD survey was completed by Alfred Voelkelt, 6th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo). The event waiver was required to support the discharge and load back of an MPS vessel, the USNS Pless, which carried ammunition with a NEW of 750,000 pounds. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was discharging the vessel as part of a Freedom Banner Exercise in conjunction the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Exercise Reception Staging Onward-movement & Integration (RSOI) 06 in South Korea. Lieutenant General Campbell signed the waiver as the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army (EUSA).

⁵³ Robert T. Chambers, e-mail message to the author, December 22, 2008. Mr. Chambers is the commercial load planner for chartered vessels calling Naha Military Seaport. It is his evaluation that the vessels he represents are capable of berthing at White Beach without restriction due to their draft, length or pier width. He also estimates that the average size of loads is approximately 30,000 square feet or less so could be managed at White Beach despite their limited staging area.

⁵⁴ COL Franklin presents a briefing titled "Managing the Relationship" to numerous dignitaries visiting Okinawa. The briefing covers history, politics and statistics for Okinawa. In the past, the US presence was the number one concern for the local population, but was replaced by economic issues in recent years. COL Mark Franklin, e-mail message to author, May 15, 2008. COL Franklin served as the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) J5, Okinawa Area Field Office (OAFO) representative from 2005-2008.

⁵⁵ John Buesse, e-mail message to author, December 22, 2007. The newspaper article was written by Ian Hillman and Yumi Baba, *Sapporo Newspaper*, December 17, 2007. This article was written in Japanese and translated by an interpreter.